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Causality and belief change play an important role in many applications. This paper focuses
on the main issues of causality and interventions in possibilistic graphical models. We
show that interventions, which are very useful for representing causal relations between
events, can be naturally viewed as a belief change process. In particular, interventions can
be handled using a possibilistic counterpart of Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning under uncertain
inputs. This paper also addresses new issues that are arisen in the revision of graphical
models when handling interventions. We ﬁrst argue that the order in which observations
and interventions are introduced is very important. Then we show that in order to correctly
handle sequences of observations and interventions, one needs to change the structure of
possibilistic networks. Lastly, an eﬃcient procedure for revising possibilistic causal trees is
provided.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Causality and belief change are two important notions that play a crucial role in many applications in Artiﬁcial Intel-
ligence and information systems. Both of them have been extensively studied in literature, in particular within different
uncertainty theory frameworks (e.g., probability theory or possibility theory). The standard probabilistic deﬁnition of A
causes B , originally discussed in [1,2], requires that the probability degree of B increases in the light of the new infor-
mation A (i.e., Pr(B|A) > Pr(B)). Namely, probabilistic causality is viewed as simple probability changes. This deﬁnition is
symmetric and indirected which is not a desirable property in causality ascription. In order to overcome this limitation
and make in evidence that causes precede their effects, other deﬁnitions of causality have been proposed (e.g., [3]). These
deﬁnitions implicitly integrate the notion of “time” (of the occurrence of the events) in the characterisation of causality re-
lation. Other deﬁnitions that take into account the fact that correlated events may be effects of some common cause (called
a spurious cause in [3]) have also been proposed.
All these earlier deﬁnitions of probabilistic causation are given when uncertain information are explicitly described by
means of probability distributions. Recently, Pearl [4] has proposed approaches based on probability theory to represent
causal relations in graphical models. The proposal made by Pearl [4], called causal Bayesian networks, goes beyond standard
Bayesian networks, where directed arcs in the graph are interpreted as representing elementary causal relations between
variables in some real domain. Causal Bayesian networks also provide formal semantics to the notion of interventions, which
plays an important role in causal ascription and for eliciting causal relations between variables. Interventions are external
actions [5,4,6] that force some variables to have some speciﬁc values. From representational point of view, interventions
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interventions consists in “ignoring” the effects of all direct (and undirected) causes related to the variable of interest.
Causality notion in the possibilistic framework remains unexplored despite its importance. In fact, only a few works has
addressed this issue (e.g., [8,9]). This paper focuses on the representation and on the handling of interventions and causal
information in possibilistic graphical models. In particular, we view the effects of interventions as a belief revision operation.
The revision of a knowledge base or a database, consists of the insertion of some input information while preserving its
consistency. During the past twenty years, many approaches have been proposed to address this problem from the axiomatic
point of view (e.g., [10,11]), from the semantics point of view (e.g., [12–14]) and from the computational point of view [15,
16]. In possibility theory, several revision operations have been proposed for both semantics and logical points of views.
However, few works address the problem of a revision of possibilistic (or even probabilistic) networks.
This paper shows that interventions in possibilistic networks can be naturally described as a belief revision process.
We provide natural properties that any possibilistic belief change operation should satisfy in order to correctly handle the
presence of interventions. We then show that interventions have a very natural encoding in the possibilistic counterpart
of Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning under uncertain inputs. This paper also addresses new issues that are arisen in belief
change when dealing with both observations and interventions. Indeed, we argue that the order in which observations and
interventions are introduced matters: an observation followed by an intervention should not be equivalent to an intervention
followed by an observation. Then we show that in order to respect this order then we need to change the structure of the
graphical model after each observation and each intervention. An eﬃcient procedure for revising possibilistic causal trees,
in a presence of a sequence of observations and interventions, is then provided.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background on possibility theory. Section 3
recalls possibilistic networks and discusses its relationships with belief change. Section 4 is fully devoted to the handling of
interventions in possibilistic graphical models. Section 5 concerns the problem of dealing with both observations and inter-
ventions, and propose an eﬃcient procedure to revise possibilistic trees. Last section provides some concluding discussions.
2. Possibility theory: a refresher
2.1. Notations
Let V = {A1, A2, . . . , AN } be a set of variables. We denote by DA = {a1, . . . ,an} the domain associated with the variable A.
By a we denote any instance of A. Ω =×Ai∈V DAi denotes the universe of discourse, which is the Cartesian product of all
variable domains in V . Similary, if X ⊆ Ω is a set of variables, then DX =×Ai∈X DAi denotes the set of instances of X . Each
element ω ∈ Ω is called an interpretation (or a state, an elementary event, etc.) of Ω . ω[x] denotes the instances of the
variables set X in ω. Similarly, [x] denotes the set of all interpretations where the variables X have their value equal to x.
Each interpretation of [x] is called a model of x. An interpretation ω in [x] is said to be a preferred model of x if there is no
interpretation ω′ in [x] such that π(ω′) > π(ω). If x and y are respectively instances of X ⊆ Ω and Y ⊆ Ω , [x∧ y] denotes
the set of interpretations where X = x and Y = y. In the following, in order to avoid heavy notations, and when there is no
ambiguity we simply write x instead [x].
Next subsection only gives a brief recalling on possibility theory, for more details see [17–19].
2.2. Possibility distributions and possibility measures
A possibility distribution π is a mapping from the set of interpretations Ω to the unit interval [0,1]. It represents a state
of knowledge about a set of possible interpretations distinguishing what is plausible from what is less plausible.
The value π(ω) expresses a degree of compatibility (or coherence) of the interpretation ω with respect to available
knowledge encoded by π . By convention, π(ω) = 0 means that the interpretation ω is impossible, and π(ω) = 1 means
that nothing prevents ω from being the real world. When π(ω) > π(ω′),ω is a preferred candidate to ω′ for being the real
state of the world. π is thus a convenient encoding of a preference relation that can embody concepts such as normality,
typicality, plausibility, consistency with available beliefs, etc.
A possibility distribution π is said to be normalized (or consistent) if ∃ω ∈ Ω , such that π(ω) = 1, namely there exists
at least an interpretation which is completely coherent with the available beliefs.
Given a possibility distribution π deﬁned on a universe of discourse Ω , we can deﬁne a mapping grading the possibility
measure of an event φ ⊆ Ω by:
Π(φ) = max
ω∈φ π(ω).
Π(φ) expresses the degree of compatibility of the event φ with available knowledge encoded by π .
Another mapping, called a necessity measure and which is dual to possibility measure, can be deﬁned as:
N(φ) = 1− Π(φ),
where φ is the complement of φ with respect to Ω . It evaluates to what extent φ is inferred from beliefs encoded by π .
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In a possibilistic setting (as in probability theory), conditioning consists in modifying our initial knowledge, encoded by a
possibility distribution π , by the arrival of a new sure piece of information φ ⊆ Ω . We assume that φ is not a contradiction
(namely φ is not empty) and that Π(φ) > 0.
There are two main deﬁnitions of possibilistic conditioning. The ﬁrst deﬁnition, proposed in [20] and [17], is called
min-based conditioning and is deﬁned by:
π(ω|φ) =
{1 if ω ∈ φ, Π(φ) = π(ω),
π(ω) if ω ∈ φ, Π(φ) > π(ω),
0 if ω /∈ φ.
(1)
The second deﬁnition is called product-based conditioning and is deﬁned by:
π(ω|φ) =
{
π(ω)
Π(φ)
if ω ∈ φ,
0 otherwise.
(2)
These two deﬁnitions are the two well-used deﬁnitions of conditioning in possibility theory (see [21] for more discus-
sions). Both of them satisfy the equation of the form:
π(ω) = π(ω|φ)♦Π(φ),
which is similar to Bayesian conditioning, ♦ is either min or product. Besides when Π(φ) = 0 then π(ω|φ) = 1 for both
deﬁnitions.
The rule based on the product is much closer to genuine Bayesian conditioning than the qualitative conditioning deﬁned
from the minimum which is purely based on the comparison of levels; product-based conditioning requires more of the
structure of the unit interval. In this paper, for sake of clarity, we only use the product-based conditioning. Product-based
conditioning is also called Dempster conditioning, since it is a specialized of Dempster’s rule of conditioning for evidence
theory, see for more details [22,23,18].
3. Possibilistic graphs
Graphical models (e.g., probabilistic networks [24–26], possibilistic networks [27–30], valuation-based systems [31]) are
compact representations of uncertainty distributions. Their success is due to their simplicity and their capacity of repre-
senting and handling independence relationships, which are important for an eﬃcient management of uncertain pieces of
information. They have been used in different applications, such as diagnosis problems or intrusion detections. This section
ﬁrst provides basic deﬁnitions of possibilistic networks, then brieﬂy discusses its relationships with belief change.
3.1. Basic deﬁnitions
A product-based possibilistic network on a set of variables V , denoted by N= (πN,GN), consists of:
• a graphical component, denoted by GN , which is a DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph). Nodes represent variables and edges
encode the inﬂuence relation between variables. The set of parents of a node A is denoted by U A and μA denotes an
instance of parents of A;
• a numerical component, denoted by πN , which quantiﬁes different links of the network. For every root node A (U A = ∅),
uncertainty is represented by a priori possibility degree πN(a) for each instance a ∈ DA , such that:
max
a
πN(a) = 1.
For the rest of the nodes (U A 
= ∅) uncertainty is represented by a conditional possibility degree πN(a|μA) of each
instance a ∈ DA and ua ∈ DUA . These conditional possibility distributions should satisfy the following normalization
condition:
max
a
πN(a|μA) = 1, for any μA .
In the following, possibility distributions πN , deﬁned on nodes level, are called local possibility distributions.
From the set of local conditional possibility distributions, one can deﬁne a unique global joint possibility distribution
similar to the one proposed in probability theory (e.g., [32,33]).
Deﬁnition 1. Let N= (πN,GN) be a possibilistic network. The joint or global possibility distribution associated with N and
denoted by πN , is expressed by the following chain rule:
πN(A1, . . . , AN ) =
∏
i=1,...,N
π(Ai |U Ai ). (3)
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Table 1
A priori possibility distribution on the node Ingredients.
Ingredients πN(Ingredients)
Harissa 1
Espelette α
Paprika α2
Table 2
Local a priori conditional possibility distribution associated with the node Hotness and the joint distribution obtained using Eq. (3).
Ingredients Hotness πN(Hotness|Ingredients) πN(Hotness, Ingredients)
Paprika Very Hot α2 α4
Paprika Hot α α3
Paprika Not Hot 1 α2
Espelette Very Hot α α2
Espelette Hot 1 α
Espelette Not Hot α2 α3
Harissa Very Hot 1 1
Harissa Hot α α
Harissa Not Hot α4 α4
Let us present an example of possibilistic network which will be used in the whole paper for illustrating main concepts
of the paper.
Example 1. Let N = (πN,GN) be a possibilistic network. The DAG (GN) associated with N is given in Fig. 1. The example
concerns a description of knowledge regarding “causal” or “inﬂuence” relation between the used ingredients and a hotness
of a meal. For sake of simplicity, we assume that the variable “Hotness of the meals” admits three values: “Very Hot” (or very
spicy), “Hot” and “Not Hot”. The variable “Ingredients” also admits three values: Paprika, Espelette pepper (a chili pepper that is
cultivated in the French commune of Espelette), and Harissa (a North African hot red sauce). Harissa is a typical spicy ingredient
that is used in North of Africa, even if several restaurants in this region use Paprika or French Espelette pepper in the
preparation of their meals (especially to satisfy European tourists).
For sake of simplicity, in this example, we assume that possibility degrees belong to the following uncertainty scale
L= {1,α,α2,α3, . . . ,0}, with 1 > α > 0.
Table 1 describes our priori knowledge on the used ingredients in North African meals. It corresponds to a priori possi-
bility distribution on the node Ingredients and expresses the facts that Harissa is the most normal used ingredient, Espelette
is less normal and Paprika is the least plausible ingredient. Similarly, Table 2 describes our priori knowledge on the hotness
of meals on the basis of used ingredients. For instance, πN(Hotness|Paprika) encodes the fact that in the context where the
used ingredient is Paprika, the instance Not Hot is the most normal one, while the two other instances Hot and Very Hot are
less normal but not excluded.
3.2. Belief change in possibilistic networks
The revision of a database or a knowledge base, consists of the insertion of some input information while preserving
its consistency. A belief revision in its simple form [10] is a process, denoted by ∗, that transforms a consistent set of
propositional formulae denoted by K (called a belief set), into a new consistent set of formulae, denoted by K ∗ ψ . The
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K ∗ ψ .
In possibility theory, the revision process can be viewed as a so-called “transmutation” [34] that modiﬁes the ranking of
interpretations, called a possibility distribution, so as to give priority to the input information. Different forms of possibilistic
revision have been proposed to deal with different type of inputs (a simple propositional formula, an uncertain observation,
a possibility distribution, etc.). Possibilistic revisions have been extensively studied from both semantics and logical points
of views [16,35–37].
However, few works address the problem of the revision of possibilistic (or even probabilistic) networks. In fact, a simple
form of belief revision exists by means of propagation algorithms in possibilistic networks. A possibilistic network represents
a background knowledge and induces a unique possibility distribution generated by Eq. (3). In the presence of new input
observations of the form X = x (namely, the new value of X are x), possibilistic networks provide eﬃcient tools that
compute ΠN(A|X = x) for any event A ⊆ Ω . Namely, they provide eﬃcient ways to compute the possibility degrees of
any event taking into account new input observations. For instance, when all variables are boolean, propagation algorithms
can determine the set of current and accepted beliefs (i.e., a belief set), deﬁned by KN = {φ: φ ⊆ Ω, Π(φ) > Π(φ)},
induced by a possibilistic network N. They can also compute the result of revising KN by a new observation ψ , deﬁned
by: KN ∗ ψ = {φ: φ ⊆ Ω, Π(φ|ψ) > Π(φ|ψ)}. If the graph associated with a possibilistic network has particular structures
(such as polytrees), then queries of the form whether an event φ belongs or not to KN ∗ ψ ′′ can be eﬃciently answered in
a polynomial time. Moreover, the order in which observations are introduced does not matter.
However, propagation algorithms do not proceed to changing the structure of possibilistic networks in order to take into
account new input observations. In fact as it is pointed out in [38], in possibilistic and probabilistic networks frameworks,
iterating belief change just means accumulating consistent observations (namely all observations should be somewhat plau-
sible) and reasoning from them using the background knowledge. The input observation is not considered as a new piece
of knowledge to be integrated in possibilistic networks, it more corresponds to information pertaining only to the case at
hand. Hence, there is no need to change the background knowledge represented by a causal network. We will see later that
if one wants to respect this order then we need to change the structure of the graphical model after each observation and
intervention.
4. Interventions as a belief change process
4.1. Intervention vs observation
Interventions are commonly viewed as external actions that force some variables to have some speciﬁc values. They play
an important role in distinguishing causation from mere correlation. A (global) joint probability alone can help to determine
correlated or independent events but cannot be used to determine causal relations. To palliate this limitation, interventions
can be used to arbitrate between several causal structures that ﬁt the correlation data equally well. This core notion was
introduced in early works (e.g., [5]), but was given its most prominent role by Pearl [4], whose deﬁnition of “A causes B”
requires that the forced occurrence of A, by means of an intervention, increases the probability of the occurrence of B .
Interventions provide a natural way for understanding causation. Identifying a causal relationship between different
elements of the system would be much easier if the agent can directly intervene in the manner of an experimenter and
evaluate the effects of such manipulations.
Interventions and observations should not be confused as illustrated by the following example:
Example 2. Let us consider again Example 1, where we assume now that you order a typical North African meal, and let
us consider two different situations.
• Observation: Assume that you get some observation (for instance by tasting the meal), where the meal is not hot.
Clearly, this new information will change your beliefs on the used ingredients. Your new beliefs will be:
πN1(Paprika) = 1 > πN1(Espelette) = α > πN1(Harissa) = α2.
The new possibility distribution πN1 is the result of revising πN by taking into account the new observation that the
meal is not hot. In fact, πN1, given in Table 3, is simply obtained by conditioning πN (given in Table 2) with the event
Hotness = Not Hot using Eq. (1).
• Intervention: Consider now another situation where we assume that before tasting the meal, a waiter adds to the meal
“Naga Jolokia”, the Indian chili tested hottest in the world at 1,040,000 SHU (Scoville heat units).1 Clearly, the waiter
action forces the variable “Hotness” to get the value “Very Hot”. Or similarly, assume that a waiter adds “kabylian berber
oil” which is known to make meals soft, namely that forces the variable “Hotness” to get the value “Not Hot”.
One thing is sure, in both cases, and without additional information, after waiter’s action there is no reason to change
our initial beliefs on the used ingredients in the meal. Namely:
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scoville_scale.
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Revised joint distribution conditioned by the event Hotness = Not Hot.
Ingredients Hotness πN1(Hotness, Ingredients)
Paprika Very Hot 0
Paprika Hot 03
Paprika Not Hot 1 1
Espelette Very Hot 0
Espelette Hot 1 0
Espelette Not Hot α
Harissa Very Hot 1 0
Harissa Hot 0
Harissa Not Hot α2
πN2(Harissa) = πN(Harissa) = 1
> πN2(Espelette) = πN(Espelette)
= α > πN2(Paprika) = πN(Paprika) = α2,
where πN2 is the result of modifying initial possibility distribution πN (given in Table 2) after the intervention on the
variable “Hotness”.
From the above example, interventions are clearly external actions (of the systems) that force variables to take some
speciﬁc values. They should not be confused with observations. The distinction between observations and interventions is
similar to the one used between belief revision [10] and updating [39]. In belief revision the new information concerns a
static world, while in updating it concerns changes in the world brought about by some agent. Observations, encoded as
possibilistic conditionings, have been largely considered in the past from semantics and logical points of views.
The following section discusses the handling of intervention in possibility theory framework.
4.2. Handling interventions
From the example of the previous section, interventions on a variable A = a can be viewed as a belief change process
that transforms a possibility distribution πN , into a new possibility distribution πN1. Of course, we assume that A = a is
somewhat plausible in πN , namely ΠN(a) > 0.
Let U A be the set of direct causes (or parents of A in GN), and DUA be the domain associated with parents of A. The
revised possibility distribution should at least satisfy the two following conditions:
R1: the event A = a is a sure piece of information, namely any event where A is different from a is considered as impossible,
and
R2: beliefs on direct causes of A are unchanged.
Clearly, these two constraints are not enough to uniquely determine πN1, and hence additional properties, in order to
capture the idea of minimal change, are needed. We propose the following four natural and minimal properties for deﬁning
πN1 (the result of revising πN after an intervention that forces A to be equal to a):
A1: ∀ui ∈ DUA , ΠN1(ui ∧ a) = ΠN(ui) and ∀ai 
= a, ΠN1(ai) = 0.
A2: ∀ui ∈ DUA , ∀ω,ω′ ∈ [ui ∧ a] if πN(ω) πN(ω′) then πN1(ω) πN1(ω′).
A3: ∀ui ∈ DUA , if ΠN(ui) = ΠN(ui ∧ a) then ∀ω ∈ [ui ∧ a]: πN1(ω) = πN(ω).
A4: If πN(ω) = 0 then πN1(ω) = 0.
A1 is a simple formal rewriting of the two conditions R1 and R2 described above. A2 means that the new possibility
distribution should preserve the previous relative order (in the wide sense) between models of each ui ∧ a, where ui is an
instance of parents of A. A stronger version of A2 can be deﬁned:
A′2: ∀ui ∈ DUA , ∀ω,ω′ ∈ [ui ∧ a] then: πN1(ω) > πN1(ω′) iff πN(ω) > πN(ω′).
A′2 is very similar to the two well-known postulates CR1, CR2 proposed in [11] for iterated belief revision in case where
we restrict to propositional language (namely when all variables admit two instances).
A3 means that when a is already accepted in a given parent context ui (namely, ΠN(ui) = ΠN(ui ∧ a)), then no changes
occur inside models of ui ∧ a. In particular, if for all ui ∈ DUA one have ΠN(ui) = ΠN(ui ∧ a) then πN should not be altered,
namely πN = πN1.
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belief revision (where input observations concern static worlds), however it may be questionable when dealing with inter-
ventions (unless ΠN(a) > 0). For instance, assume that in our running example that we observe that the meal is very hot,
which means ∀ω /∈ [Very Hot], πN(ω) = 0. Then, after this observation, a waiter adds “kabylian berber oil” which forces the
variable Hotness = Not Hot. Clearly, in this case A4 contradicts A1–A3. This is why for any intervention A = a, we assume
that ΠN(a) > 0.
Note that there are no further constraints which relate models of different [ui ∧ a]’s in the new possibility distribu-
tion πN1. Note also that A1–A4 imply that πN1 is normalized. This is directly obtained from A1 and from the fact that
maxui∈DUA ΠN(ui) = 1.
Clearly, properties A1–A4 do not guarantee a unique deﬁnition of πN1. In fact, in order to satisfy ∀ui , ΠN1(ui ∧ a) =
ΠN(ui), at least one of the preferred model of each ui ∧ a should be upgraded until reaching ΠN(ui). In order to avoid any
arbitrary choice, a reasonable assumption is to consider that the possibility degrees of all best models of ui ∧a in πN should
be increased to ΠN(ui). Regarding remaining models ui ∧ a, we have two options:
• The ﬁrst option is to simply left the possibility degrees of each non-preferred model unchanged. The possibility distri-
bution πN1 is then:
∀ui, ∀ω ∈ [ui ∧ a], πN1(ω) =
{
ΠN(ui) if ΠN(ui ∧ a) = πN(ω),
πN(ω) otherwise
(4)
and ∀ω /∈ [a], πN1(ω) = 0.
• The second option is to proportionally rescale all models of [ui ∧ a] upwards, which leads to the following deﬁnition:
∀ui, ∀ω ∈ [ui ∧ a], πN1(ω) = ΠN(ui) ∗ πN(ω)
ΠN(ui ∧ a) , (5)
and ∀ω /∈ [a], πN1(ω) = 0.
One can check that Eq. (5) (resp. Eq. (4)) can be obtained by using the possibilistic counterparts of Jeffrey’s rule [40]
of conditioning under a particular set of uncertain inputs. The possibilistic counterpart of Jeffrey’s rule [40] provides an
effective means to revise a possibility distribution π to π ′ given an input of the form of a possibility distributions bearing
on a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events φi ’s. More precisely, the input information is given in the form of pairs
I = {(φi, βi): i = 1, . . . ,n}, where φi ’s deﬁne a partition of Ω , with the two constraints:
∀(φi, βi) ∈ I, Π ′(φi) = βi (6)
and
∀(φi, βi) ∈ I, ∀ψ ⊆ Ω, Π(ψ |φi) = Π ′(ψ |φi). (7)
The underlying interpretation of revision implied by the constraint of Eq. (7) is that the revised possibility distribution
π ′ must not change conditional probability degrees of any event ψ given any uncertain events φi .
When one uses product-based conditioning in Eq. (7), the two constraints above uniquely determine the possibility
distribution π ′ given by:
∀(φi, βi) ∈ I, ∀ω ∈ φi, π ′(ω) = βi ∗ π(ω|φi). (8)
Clearly, Eq. (5) is a particular case of Eq. (8). It is enough to deﬁne the input I as:
I = {([ui ∧ a],ΠN([ui])): ui ∈ DUA and a ∈ DA}∪ {(ai,0): ai ∈ DA and ai 
= a}.
Therefore, interventions can be naturally encoded using possibilistic counterpart of Jeffrey’s rule. This result reinforces
the expressive power of possibilistic counterparts of Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning, since it has already been shown in [41]
that it covers main belief revisions operations such as: adjustment [12], natural belief revision [13,42], drastic belief revision
[43–45], revision of an epistemic by another epistemic state [46], improvement operators [47], etc. This result also shows
that interventions provide a nice example where the application of Jeffrey’s rule is fully meaningful.
4.3. Other representations of interventions
The effects of an intervention on a variable A implies that our beliefs on parents set of A, given by means of probabil-
ity or possibility distributions, will not be affected. Clearly, the handling of interventions is more motived by a graphical
structure rather than by uncertainty frameworks. Therefore, this section shows that the different graphical representations
of interventions proposed in probabilistic causal models have natural counterparts in possibilistic graphical models (see also
[9]). In fact, the “do” operator proposed in [4] to encode interventions, was ﬁrstly introduced in [7] in the ordinal conditional
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functions of Spohn [42] a model for uncertainty representation closely related to inﬁnitesimal probabilities and possibility
theory [21,48].
Let N be a possibilistic network, and assume that we have an intervention that forces a variable Ai to take a given
value aij . Interventions can then be described graphically in causal networks in two equivalent ways. The ﬁrst way consists
in modifying N by proceeding to the deletion of links from U Ai pointing into Ai . The obtained possibilistic network is called
a mutilated possibilistic network, denoted by Nmut. The joint distribution associated with Nmut is then obtained by using
Eq. (3). Let ω = (a1, . . . ,an) ∈ Ω where for each i = 1, . . . ,n, ai denotes an instance of the variable Ai . We have:
∀ω ∈ Ω, πNmut(ω) =
{∗ j 
=i ΠN(a j|uA j ) if ω[Ai] = aij and ω[U A j ] = μA j ,
0 otherwise.
(9)
As it is illustrated by the schema of Fig. 2 the joint distribution obtained using Eq. (9) is equivalent to the joint dis-
tribution obtained using Eq. (5) or Eq. (8). Namely, given a possibilistic network N, handling intervention can equivalently
be achieved: i) either by computing the joint distribution associated with N then applying the possibilistic counterpart of
Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning, or ii) by computing the mutilated graph and its associated joint distribution.
The second equivalent way to graphically representing interventions consists in adding, for each variable that may un-
dergo an intervention, a new variable denoted DOAi . The variable DOAi is added as a new parent of Ai , and controls the
status of the variables of Ai . It takes a value doAi-noact when no intervention is observed and a value doai when an inter-
vention occurs forcing Ai to take the value ai (ai belonging to the domain of Ai). The resulting graph is called augmented
possibilistic networks. Interventions on a variable A in an initial possibilistic network N is then equivalent to observation
on the node DOAi in its associated augmented possibilistic network.
Note that the augmented graphs representation of interventions is very close to the so-called virtual evidence [26]
proposed for dealing with uncertain observations in standard probabilistic networks. This is not very surprising since on
one hand we have seen that interventions have natural encoding using Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning under uncertain inputs,
and on the other hand it has been shown in [49] that there are one by one translations between Pearl’s virtual evidence
method and Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning.
From a computational point of view, in possibility theory framework, the better option to compute the effect of in-
terventions is to use augmented graphs, since it allows the reuse of existent propagation algorithms (such as possibilistic
adaptations of junction trees) without any extra costs (see [9] for more details).
Existing propagation algorithms in possibilistic networks do not allow to take into account a sequence of observations
and interventions. Indeed, they are handled as if one ﬁrst have all interventions, followed by all observations. The following
section argues that the order in which interventions and observations arrive matter, and propose a solution for possibilistic
causal trees.
5. Handling both interventions and observations
It is well known that revising a possibility distribution π , using possibilistic conditioning, by observations is a commuta-
tive operation. Namely, a revision by a ﬁrst observation A = a followed by a second observation B = b, is equivalent to the
revision by B = b followed by A = a, and is also equivalent to the revision by observing simultaneously A = a and B = b.
Similarly, one can easily check that the order on which interventions arrive does not matter. Namely, the intervention on
a variable A followed by an intervention on a variable B , is equivalent to ﬁrst have an intervention on a variable B followed
by an intervention A.
Now the situation is different when we have a sequence of interventions and observations. In this case, we argue that
an intervention on A followed by an observation on B (Fig. 3) should not be equivalent to the situation where we ﬁrst have
an observation on B followed by an intervention on A (Fig. 4).
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Fig. 4. Observations followed by Interventions.
Example 3. Let us continue again our simple example, where we consider two scenarios:
• In the ﬁrst scenario (an observation followed by an intervention), we ﬁrst taste the meal and observe that it is not
hot. Then, after this observation we add “Kabylian berber oil” to the meal. Clearly, at the end we obtain that the most
plausible state is that the used ingredient is Paprika (induced from ﬁrst observations), and the meal is not hot.
• In the second scenario (an intervention followed by an observation), we ﬁrst add “Kabylian berber oil” to the meal, then
we observe that the meal is not hot (without surprise). In this second scenario, the most plausible state is that the used
ingredient is Harissa (since it was the most plausible used ingredient before the intervention), and the meal is not hot.
The fact that the order in which observations and interventions matter is not very surprising, since a similar behaviour
holds for Jeffrey’s rule where it is well known that it does not commute [50]. The question now is how to deal with a
sequence of observations and interventions, without an explicit computation of revised joint distributions resulting from
taking into account new observations and interventions. The idea is to compute possibilistic networks which represent
counterparts of revised possibility distributions. The situation is immediate in a presence of an intervention, thanks to
the mutilated graph presented in the previous section. The problem is more diﬃcult in the presence of observation. The
following subsection addresses this issue.
5.1. Conditioning = combination + normalization
In order to compute a revised possibilistic causal network that integrates a new observation A = a, we will view the
process of conditioning as a sequence of two operations: i) a combination of initial possibility distribution with the one
associated with the input A = a, and ii) in case of conﬂict, a normalization operation of the possibility distribution obtained
after the combination step. This construction is only meaningful under the following very reasonable assumption: If A
causes B , and if, after introducing a given observation C , A and B are related, then A still causes B .
Let N1 be a possibilistic network, and πN1 be its associated possibility distribution obtained using Eq. (3). Deﬁne:
∀ω ∈ Ω, πA=a(ω) =
{
1 if ω[A] = a,
0 otherwise.
(10)
Then, let us deﬁne the combination operation as follows:
∀ω ∈ Ω, πN2(ω) = πN(ω) ∗ πA=a(ω). (11)
The possibility distribution πN2 is obtained from πN1(ω) by considering any interpretation ω, where the value of A is
different from a, as impossible, while leaving possibility degrees of models of a unchanged.
Clearly, πN2 may be subnormalized, and its normalization operation is deﬁned as follows:
∀ω ∈ Ω, πN3(ω) = πN2(ω)
h(πN2)
, (12)
where h(πN2) = maxω∈Ω πN2(ω).
Then one can easily check that product-based conditioning, given by Eq. (1), is indeed equivalent to a sequence of two
operations: a combination operation followed by a normalization operation. Namely:
∀ω ∈ Ω, πN1(ω|A = a) = πN3(ω). (13)
We now provide the graphical counterparts of combination and normalization operations. For sake of simplicity, we
restrict ourself to possibilistic causal networks where DAG’s are trees.
5.2. Graphical counterpart of the combination operation
This subsection provides the graphical counterpart of the combination operation, illustrated by Fig. 2.
Let us denote by N2 the result of combining N1 with the new observation A = a. N2 is obtained from N1 by proceeding
to two modiﬁcations on the node A and its parent (see Fig. 5). More precisely,
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Deﬁnition 2. The possibilistic network N2 is such that:
• its graph GN2 is obtained from GN2 by simply removing the arc from the parent of A (here denoted D) to A,
• its local possibility distributions, deﬁned on variables different from A and D , are identical to the ones given on N1.
Regarding, the variables A and D the new local possibility distributions are deﬁned as follows:
– ∀ai ∈ DA ,
πN2(ai) =
{
1 if ai = a,
0 otherwise.
– ∀di ∈ DA , ∀c j ∈ DC
πN2(di |c j) = πN2(di|c j) ∗ πN1(a|di).
The new local possibility distribution on the variable A conﬁrms that only the instance a is fully possible, while the
other instances are impossible. The local distribution on the node D (parent of A) is modiﬁed in order to guarantee that
possibility degrees of models of a are identical in πN1 and πN2. Besides, since the value of the variable of A is now fully
determined, there is no need to maintain the arc from the parent of A (here D) to A.
One can easily check that:
∀ω ∈ Ω, πN2(ω) = πN1(ω) ∗ πA=a(ω).
Hence, N2 is indeed the graphical counterpart of the combination operation.
5.3. Graphical counterpart of the normalization process
After the combination step, if πN2 is normalized then N2 exactly encodes the result of revising N1 by the observation
A = a. Now, it may happen that πN2 is subnormalized, which means that a was not accepted in initial possibilistic causal
network N1. In this case, we need to renormalize πN2. Our goal consists then in computing a possibilistic network, denoted
by N3, such that:
∀ω, πN3(ω) = πN2(ω)
h(πN2)
. (14)
The network N3 is constructed such that all of its local possibility distributions are normalized. N3 is obtained by
progressively normalizing local distributions for each variable. We ﬁrst study the case where only the local possibility
distribution on the root variable in N2 is subnormalized. In this particular case, N3 is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3. Let N2 be the possibilistic network obtained from the combination step. Assume that only the root variable,
denoted by A, is subnormalized. Let maxa∈DA (πN3(a)) = β and 0 < β < 1. Let us deﬁne N3 such that:
• GN3 = GN2,
• ∀X , X 
= A, πN3(X |UX ) = πN2(X |UX ),
• ∀a ∈ DA , πN3(a) = πN2(a)/β .
Then we can show, in this particular case, that:
∀ω, πN3(ω) = πN2(ω)
h(πN2)
.
Namely, N3 encodes the result of normalizing N2.
The question now is how to deal with a variable A which is not a root. In this situation, we solve the problem by
modifying local possibility distributions associated with the parent of the variable A. This modiﬁcation does not change joint
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Possibility distribution on the nodes “Ingredients” and “Hotness” after the combination step.
Ingredients πN1(Ingredients) Hotness πN1(Hotness)
Harissa α4 Very Hot 0
Espelette α3 Hot 0
Paprika α2 Not Hot 1
Table 5
Possibility distribution on the nodes “Ingredients” and “Hotness” after the normalization step.
Ingredients πN2(Ingredients) Hotness πN2(Hotness)
Harissa α2 Very Hot 0
Espelette α Hot 0
Paprika 1 Not Hot 1
global possibility distribution. However, the result may produce, as a side effect, subnormalized possibility distributions on
parent of A. Hence, the normalization process should be repeated from leaves to the root variables. When we reach roots,
it is enough to apply Deﬁnition 3 to get a possibilistic network with normalized local possibility distributions.
Deﬁnition 4. Let N2 be a possibilistic network obtained from the combination step. Let A be a variable and B its parent.
Assume that there is an instance ‘b’ of B such that: maxa∈DA πN2(a|b) = β where 0 < β < 1. Let us deﬁne N3 where its
graph is the same as the one of N2 and its local possibility distributions associated with N3 are deﬁned as:
1. ∀C 
= A, ∀C 
= B , πN3(C |UC ) = πN2(C |UC ).
2. ∀a j , ∀bi ,
πN3(a j|bi) =
{
πN2(a j |bi)
β
if bi = b,
πN2(a j|bi) otherwise.
3. ∀bi , ∀μbi ,
πN3(bi|μbi ) =
{
πN2(bi|μbi ) ∗ β if bi = b,
πN2(bi|μbi ) otherwise.
The three conditions of the above deﬁnition allow to normalize local possibility distributions at a node A. The ﬁrst
condition says that possibility distributions associated with variables, different from A and B (the parent of A), remain
unchanged. The second condition speciﬁes that normalization only affects the variable A. Lastly, the third condition applies
on the variable B (parent of A) the reverse operation of normalization, which ensures the equivalence between joint distri-
butions. Hence, Deﬁnition 4 allows to normalize local distributions of variables having one parent, without modifying the
joint global distribution, namely:
∀ω, πN3(ω) = πN2(ω).
Deﬁnitions 3 and 4 allow to easily determine the possibilistic networks associated to the normalization of πN2. It is
enough to repetitively apply Deﬁnitions 3 and 4, from leafs to roots, until all local possibility distributions are normalized.
The renormalization of subnormalized possibilistic network is achieved in a linear time with respect to the number of
parameters (possibility degrees) in the graphs.
Example 4. Let us continue our running example by providing the possibilistic networks in the two scenarios given in
Example 3. Let N1 be the possibilistic network given in Example 1, representing initial knowledge and beliefs before any
interventions or observations.
• Recall that in the ﬁrst scenario, we ﬁrst have an observation that the meal is not hot, followed by the intervention
of adding kabylian berber oil to the meal. In order to compute the possibilistic network resulting for the observation,
we ﬁrst apply Deﬁnition 2, which gives a possibilistic network N1 composed of two independent nodes, and where its
associated possibility distributions are described in Table 4.
The possibility distribution on the node “ingredient” is not normalized. Applying Deﬁnition 3 gives a possibilistic net-
work N2 where all of its associated possibility distributions are now normalized and are described by Table 5.
One can easily check that the possibility distribution on the variable ingredients given in Table 5 is exactly the same
as the one obtained from the result of conditioning the joint distribution (given in Table 2) with the event Hotness =
Not Hot.
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Possibility distribution on the nodes “Ingredients” and “Hotness” after Intervention.
Ingredients πN3(Ingredients) Hotness πN3(Hotness)
Harissa 1 Very Hot 1
Espelette α Hot 0
Paprika α2 Not Hot 0
Lastly, the intervention has as no additional effect since the variable “Hotness” is now a root node and that Hotness =
Not Hot is already accepted.
Clearly, Table 5 recovers the expected result, namely after the observation Hotness = Not Hot, followed by an intervention
Hotness = Not Hot, we get that in the most plausible interpretation, the used ingredient is “Paprika” and that the meal
is not hot.
• In the second scenario, we recall that we ﬁrst have an intervention Hotness = Not Hot, followed by an observation
Hotness = Not Hot. The handling of this second scenario is very simple since i) starting with an intervention immediately
provides a possibilistic network N2 with two independent nodes, with the possibility distributions πN3 given in Table 6,
and ii) the observation has no effect after the intervention.
Again, in this scenario, we get the expected result where the most plausible event is that the used ingredient is “Harissa”
and that the meal is not hot. This running example clearly illustrates that the order in which interventions and obser-
vations are introduced matter.
6. Concluding discussions
This paper dealt with the problem of handling interventions in possibilistic causal networks which play an important
in representing causality relations and for causal ascription. We showed that interventions in possibilistic graphical models
have a natural encoding as a belief change process, using the possibilistic counterpart of Jeffrey’s rule. We provided several
natural properties that a possibilistic belief change operation should satisfy in order to deal with interventions. We showed
that in order to correctly deal with sequences of observations and interventions one needs to revise the structure of possi-
bilistic networks. This clearly raises new issues in the problem of revising possibilistic networks, in particular how to revise
a possibilistic causal networks when an intervention concerns an impossible event. In [8], the authors proposed a possibilis-
tic model for causality ascription that answers queries of the form “is the event A a cause of the event B?”. The proposed
model is based on a non-monotonic inference relation which satisﬁes the requirements of System P [51]. Results of this
paper can improve this model regarding at least three aspects. The ﬁrst one is that using a possibilistic graphical model
allows to derive more causal relations, due to the addition of rational monotony property satisﬁed by a graphical model.
The second aspect concerns the introduction of intervention in their model. Lastly, the third aspect concerns computational
issues, where possibilistic graphical models offer eﬃcient tools for reasoning from causal relations.
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